Summary: Considering the soundness and completeness of inference rules.
The folly of mistaking a paradox for a discovery, a metaphor for a proof, a torrent of verbiage for a spring of capital truths, and oneself for an oracle, is inborn in us. — Paul Valery, poet and philosopher (1871-1945)
Throughout this discussion, we've implicitly
assumed that if we've proven something, it must be true.
But we should be careful:
What if one of those listed inference rule isn't always valid?
What if we introduced a new rule?
(Sure, you'd probably balk if
we proposed something silly like
If we omitted the RAA inference rule, would this new system be sound? Would it be complete?
It would be sound: Look at all the possible proofs that can be made in the original system; all those proofs lead to true conclusions (since that original system is sound, as we're claiming). If we just discard all those that include RAA, the remaining proofs are still all true, so the smaller system is sound.
It would not be complete, though:
As pointed out, RAA is our only way to prove negations without
premises.
There are negated formulas that are true
(and have no premises) —
for example