What Teachers Wear to School: The Administrative Dilemma

Module by: Charles Waggoner

Summary: The debate over what teachers should wear to school has been a sporadic battle seemingly forever. Can school boards and administrators find some common ground with teachers that will ensure that the classroom is a place where teachers can be respected, yet still have their First Amendment rights preserved? Teacher dress codes create a myriad of issues for any administrator or school board that pursues this issue.

He reasoned that amusement parks like Disneyland, because their image depends upon projecting a family-friendly persona, set very strict dress codes for all employees, and the McDonald’s official campus known as Hamburger University in Chicago stipulates that business casual does not include jeans (of any type or color), could it be too much to ask our teachers not to wear blue denim jeans to teach impressionable students? Could we not rise to the professional look of the folks working for Disneyland and McDonalds? “Let’s dress professionally, people.

No blue denim.” That’s all that Dr. Spiffy was asking of his teaching staff. The edict had the effect of fanning the fashion passions of most of the teachers, even those who did not own a pair of blue denim jeans. Teachers do not like to be told how to dress, particularly when they feel that there is “nothing wrong with nice well-pressed and well-maintained blue jeans.”

There was no official or unofficial teacher dress code for the teachers in Dr. Spiffy’s district, and in fact, there were only a few teachers that dressed in jeans on the “casual pay-day Fridays.” Dr. Spiffy thought that the no-blue denim dress rule would have no impact on the majority of the staff and those whom he considered to have this bad habit of dressing down would happily comply. Dr. Spiffy was mistaken.

For decades, students’ apparel has been scrutinized by school officials and teachers who can make them change clothes, turn their tee shirts inside out, or send them home for a violation of the student dress code. Most, if not all schools, have a rather detailed student dress code that is readily accessible in the student and parent handbooks. In the humble opinion of Dr. Spiffy, the teachers had become much too cavalier with their dress and needed to spiff up their image in the eyes of the students and the community. The wearing of blue jeans by teachers sent a wrong message to the students that Dr. Spiffy saw as unprofessional. He felt because so many of the children in his district rarely saw a “professional person,” that all teachers, all of the time, needed to project the image of a professional. This is not an uncommon belief among administrators and school boards.

Likely some of the best advice given to graduate students in a school law class is to “have the phone number of your school district attorney on speed dial, and before doing anything outside the realm of current school policy, call and ask.” Dr. Spiffy remembered this advice too late and called the school district attorney after the jean rebellion was underway. The attorney’s advice was “Should not have gone there.” Staff dress codes are, in the attorney’s words, “the proverbial slippery slope” where traction is very difficult to obtain. The attorney further advised that only administrators and school boards that have a death wish would attempt to mount this particular mountain of attempting to tell teachers what to wear to school in the manner in which this district had gone about it.

Undaunted, and with the full support of the school board, Superintendent Spiffy issued another dress code edict which clearly stipulated that blue denim jeans were not considered acceptable attire for teachers and were not acceptable at any time in the classroom, and blue was not the only color of offense. Any color of denim had now become taboo. Casual Friday no longer existed for any color of denim. No denim, ever, period. Although Dr. Spiffy did not perceive this to be a particular problem, the new edict also included sweat pants, shorts, t-shirts and flip-flops as unacceptable attire. Exceptions to this rule were naturally accorded. Physical education classes were exempt from the shorts and sweat pants rule and denim was acceptable on certain area field trips with the prior permission of the building principal.

After the no-jeans letter was distributed it took the teachers’ union only a week to file a grievance stating in part that the district had failed to meet and discuss changes in the contract with “respect to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment,” as required in the State Statutes. How could the wearing of jeans be a term and condition of employment? A second phone call to the school attorney generated additional discussions of escalating degrees of the slippery slope and the advice was to rescind the teacher dress code directive and proceed on with the school year. This time the board and superintendent took the advice of the attorney and Superintendent Spiffy acquiesced and casual Friday became what it was before with most of the staff now participating.

The result of the intrusion into the decision of what the teachers chose to wear to school resulted in several teachers wearing denim of some hue every school day, not just on casual Friday.

Superintendent Spiffy and the district had egg on their faces over the matter, but should they have? Should they have fought the issue in the courts? The question of teacher dress continues to plague school administrators and school boards from time to time. A review of some previous court cases and some common sense regulations for administrators and school boards would be in order.

In the good old days prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Tinker, school boards and administrators had a rather firm grasp on all of the controls, including what teachers were expected to wear. Rules of conduct published by a West Virginia Board of Education in 1915 stated in part that a teacher “may not dress in bright colors; must wear at least two petticoats; and that dresses must be no shorter than two inches above the ankle.”

In the 1960s the principal of a high school in Pasadena, California, initiated a policy that called for the “practice by teachers of the common social amenities, as evidenced by acceptable dress and grooming, and requiring that they be appropriately attired on all occasions and that they set an example of cleanliness, neatness, and good taste.” (Finot v. Pasadena, 1967)

The instructor’s handbook in Pasadena stated that beards, moustaches, and excessively long hair were not appropriate for male students, and that it was determined that the wearing of facial hair by teachers would encourage students to emulate that behavior. Therefore, the principal issued the no-facial hair directive. Finot, a teacher with a beard, forced the issue and refused to shave. The school board reassigned Finot to a home tutoring position with the district, as the administration was concerned that the teacher’s beard might attract undue attention, interfere with the education process, and make the prohibition of facial hair for students at the high school all that much more of a difficult rule to enforce.

Perhaps surprising for the year in which this case was decided, the California Court of Appeals found for Finot, the teacher. The Court in rather ambiguous terms stated that “This is not to say that all male teachers at all high schools, regardless of circumstances, may wear beards while they are teaching in classrooms and that the practice may not be prohibited or otherwise restrained under appropriate circumstances. We hold simply that, on the record before us, beards as such, on male teachers without regard to their general appearance, their neatness and their cleanliness, cannot constitutionally be banned in the classroom.” (Finot, 1967) In other words, as we find in many school related cases that come before the courts, the answer is that “it depends.”

It appears that unless the school can show that the facial hair on teachers has some adverse effect on the educational process, it could not be banned. We might extrapolate from the ruling that had the beard been dirty or in some other way wildly unkempt which created a disturbance or perhaps a safety hazard in the instruction of woodworking, then the Court would have seen the issue very differently. The Finot decision illustrates a pattern that we see emerge in most if not all of the teacher personal appearance cases. The courts will base their determination of a “Rule of Law” and consider a particular set of facts which may be unique to a particular situation.

The First, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as provisions of most state constitutions are all offered as guarantees against deprivation of life, liberty or property without due process of law and the equal protection of rules in public education dress code cases. As we see the pattern develop, the school district winning a personal appearance case in court can be, and often is, a grab-bag and very dependent upon the unique set of facts that relate to the particular case at hand.

Three cases were settled in 1969, the first being a Louisiana case in which a teacher was dismissed for willful neglect of duty because he refused to wear a necktie to school. (Blanchett v. Vermillion, 1969) The school board resolution that was adopted in September of 1967 provided that “in the interest of enhancing the image of the teaching profession at school in the classroom and in the community, it shall be required that male teachers wear neckties in the official performance of their duties during the course of the school day.” (Blanchett, 1969) The basis for the requirement was the feeling that neckties magnified the image of the educator as a professional person, leading to more student and community respect for the person and for the profession.

During the trial, members of the school board testified that there had been no community complaints concerning the dress of male teachers, and board members admitted that often they did not wear ties at school board meetings. The Court made note that the plaintiff refused to wear ties not out of a spirit of rebellion, but from a sincere belief that the rule greatly infringed upon his liberty to dress in accordance to his lifetime habit of not wearing a necktie.

In spite of the testimony, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the necktie regulation was not so unreasonable as to be outside of the board’s power to dictate. The Court noted that the dress of a teacher does indeed enhance the authority of the teacher in both the eyes of the students and the community; the regulation was not vague in nature; and did not discriminate against men teachers because female teachers did not have to comply to the rule; and that no legal authority prohibits a board of education from adopting reasonable rules and regulations. The purpose of the board’s rule was to enhance the professional image of the male teachers and because there was some evidence to support this rule, the Court concluded that it could not find the necktie policy to be either arbitrary or unreasonable. (Blanchett, 1969)

A case that was settled in 1969 involved the principal of Ribault Senior High in Duval County, Florida, instructing the only black teacher on the staff to remove his goatee. There was no written school or district policy forbidding facial hair; it was only a long-standing custom in the district. The teacher refused and was dismissed from the district. (Braxton v. Board, 1969) The Court agreed with the teacher in this case that the dismissal was inappropriate and that the request of the principal to remove the goatee was totally arbitrary, unreasonable, and based solely on personal preference. The Court further stated that when a goatee is worn by a black man “it is an expression of his heritage and racial pride,” which enjoys the protection of First Amendment rights. (Braxton, 1969) Does this ruling imply that goatees may be acceptable for some groups and not for others?

The third dress code case that was determined in 1969 involved a non-tenured teacher who was dismissed in mid-year for refusing to shave his beard. (Lucia v. Duggan, 1969) Lucia grew a beard during the winter vacation. The beard conflicted with an unwritten policy of the school district as explained to Lucia by the superintendent upon his return to the classroom. When Lucia failed to shave the beard as directed, he was called before the board of education and was suspended for insubordination and for not setting a proper example as a teacher.

The Court in this case did not have to determine the issue of whether the wearing of a beard was protected or not. The bearded teacher was reinstated and awarded back wages due to a procedural error on the part of the school district in not giving the plaintiff the required thirty days of notice of termination that was required by the contract and the failure of the school district in not granting him proper procedural due process.

Lucia demonstrates that a teacher should not be dismissed or disciplined for wearing facial hair unless there is a specific policy to that effect; that teachers are given notification of the policy and the probable consequences of not observing the policy; and that teachers are given the right to request a hearing.

The Supreme Court of Tennessee ruled in 1973 that a school board’s regulation forbidding teachers from wearing beards was within the bounds of reason and, therefore, did not deny the teacher in question any rights under the Tennessee Teacher Tenure Act. The Court found that the rule prohibiting beards was reasonable and not discriminatory and that the continued failure to obey the rule by the plaintiff amounted to nothing more or less than insubordination. (Morrison v. Board, 1973)

In Morrison the Tennessee Supreme Court wrote: “The grooming of one person is of concern not only to himself but to all others with whom he comes in contact; we have to look at each other whether we like it or not. It is for this reason that society sets certain limits upon the freedom of individuals to choose his own grooming.”

The Court also noted in Morrison that the legislature of Tennessee recognized the many numerous and perplexing problems that arise in the operation of the public schools, and that school boards were granted broad discretionary powers to make rules and regulations as the board deemed advisable. Any other decision, the Court felt, would result in general confusion and detriment to the efficiency of the public schools in Tennessee.

Max Miller, a non-tenured teacher in Illinois, was terminated for nine specific reasons in 1971, none of which alluded to his personal appearance. However Miller felt that the “real reason” for his dismissal was the disapproval of his beard and long sideburns by the school board. Miller might have been correct in his assumption as his principal recommended him for re-employment, but the school board overturned that recommendation with what they considered to be a “legitimate reason” of their own.

The case went to the U.S. Seventh Circuit Court and was decided in 1974. The Court felt that there were nine sufficient reasons to terminate Miller without the Court considering the teacher’s contention that his Constitutional rights had been violated because of the wearing of facial hair. (Miller v. School District, 1974) It should go without saying that an untenured teacher should be very astute and circumspect when it comes to potentially upsetting the powers that run the school district. Sometimes school boards will ignore the recommendations of the administration.

The Seventh Circuit did take the opportunity to enunciate a rather broad statement on the issue of teacher dress in public schools. Referring to the case of Ham v. South Carolina, 1973, in which the Supreme Court of the United States ruled “that a defendant’s conviction could not be overturned because he wore a beard and that the jury might harbor a prejudice against people with beards,” the Seventh Circuit reasoned in Miller that “from the earliest days of organized society, no absolute right to an unfettered choice of appearance has ever been recognized; that matters of appearance and dress have always been subjected to control and regulation, sometimes by custom and social pressure, and sometimes by legal rules.”

Although the Seventh Circuit recognized that a requirement to shave off a beard or sideburns is a more significant impairment to an individual’s interest than a requirement that he wear a tie or coat during school hours because it has a greater impact on his private after-school-life, the Court said that it was a deprivation of degree rather than kind. The Court quoted Supreme Court Justice Black, sitting as a Circuit Judge in Karr v. Schmidt, 1972, “There can be honest differences of opinion as to whether any government, state or federal, should as a matter of public policy regulate the length of hair, but it would be difficult to prove by reason, logic, or common sense that the federal judiciary is more competent to deal with hair length than are the local school authorities and state legislatures of all our fifty states.”

The Seventh Circuit also felt that dress and hairstyle matters were of relatively trivial importance on any scale of values that might be used in assessing the qualifications of a teacher. However, the Court made it clear that although the question of dress and grooming might not be how the Court would act as members of a board of education when making an employment decision, they felt that the decision was the board’s and not the court’s. In the Seventh Circuit’s opinion, “if a school board concludes that a teacher’s style of dress or plumage has an adverse impact on the educational process, and if that conclusion conflicts with the teacher’s interest in selecting his own life style, the court had no doubt that the interest of the teacher is subordinate to the public interest.” (Miller, 1974)

A non-tenured French teacher was dismissed because her department head objected to the length of the skirts that she wore and the effect that her skirt length had upon the students of the school. (Tardif v. Quinn, 1976) Tardif sued the district alleging that her constitutional rights were violated because she was not allowed to wear short skirts to school. In the actual letter of termination to Tardif there were four reasons given for her termination as a non-tenured teacher and only one might be construed as having something to do with her choices of dress, and that was “poor image.”

Sorting through the termination notification of Tardif, the Court determined that the substantive reason for the termination was indeed because Tardif’s image was, in the words of the Court, “over-exposed.” The Tardif court quoted from the case of Kelley v. Johnson, 1976, when the Supreme Court of the United States said that “whatever constitutional aspect there may be to one’s choice of apparel generally, it is hardly a matter which falls totally beyond the scope of the demand which an employer, public or private, can legitimately make upon its employees.”

The Court in Tardif refused to extend constitutional protection to clothing regulations for teachers, which the Court believed involved less personal matters than facial hair and affected teachers only during the hours of school operation, not twenty-four hours a day as facial hair would.

A case involving the specific issue of teacher dress codes was decided by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 1977. Richard Brimley, a teacher in the East Hartford, Connecticut, School District, brought suit against the board of education because of the board’s requirement that male teachers wear a shirt and tie with a sports jacket while engaged in teaching. (East Hartford v. Board, 1977) Brimley’s grievance over the issue went to arbitration and the decision was heard before Professor Archibald Cox. The grievance was dismissed as not arbitrable because the subject was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement.

Brimley pursued the matter to the District Court, arguing that an individual’s appearance was protected by the First Amendment as a form of symbolic speech. Brimley lost the case in the District Court and appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that “when teachers are neat and reasonable in their appearance, they should be given a wide discretion in matters of personal dress in the classroom.” Brimley taught both English and filmmaking, and he objected to the shirt and tie worn with the sport jacket and sought to wear a turtleneck sweater or an open-necked sport shirt with the jacket.

No claim was made by the board of education that Brimley’s dress would cause any disruption or any problem with student discipline, or interfere with any of the formal school operations. The principal of the building had on occasion given Brimley permission to wear the more casual attire during his filmmaking class, but would not give permission for any exceptions to the shirt, tie and sport jacket for the English class.

Two judges of the Second Circuit were persuaded by the arguments of the school board, which was essentially ‘this is our rule’, but the majority of the judges were not. The Second Circuit utilized the United States Supreme Court’s decree in Roe v. Wade, 1973, that “there is a right to control one’s own body,” and this was used as part of the justification that favored Brimley in the final decision.

In addition to the general liberty interest in one’s appearance, the Brimley Court reasoned, that in the teaching context there “is a First Amendment interest that in and of itself should be protected from the needless regulation by the State. The academic context has long been given special constitutional protection in this nation, because of the educational needs of a free people.” (Epperson v. Arkansas, 1968)

The appellees in the Brimley case advanced the notion that the dress code established a professional image for teachers which in turn promoted good grooming among the students. It was further alleged that the dress code aided in the maintenance of respect for teachers and in the general decorum of the classroom. The Court rejected the notion of “professional image” as being so vague as to be almost meaningless. The court said that the board wanted teachers such as Brimley to wear ties to enhance their “professional image” amounted to little more than a statement that it wants teachers to wear ties simply because it wants them to wear ties.

A more persuasive argument for the Court was that of Brimley that being tieless may help to maintain students’ respect, as teenagers are often rebellious of authority, and may find a tieless teacher to be less remote, and a more contemporary figure with whom the students can more easily relate and interact. Thus feeling more at ease in Brimley’s tieless environment, the students may be better prepared to listen with care and give attention to the teacher, or so reasoned the Second Circuit in 1977.

Justice Harlan referred to those “purposeless restraints” described in Poe v. Ullman, 1961, which typified the dress code in Brimley, “A school board may make regulations that help to promote the effective and efficient education of children, but it may not, however, make regulations that infringe on constitutional interests while not furthering the proper purpose of the board.”

In finding for the appellants the Second Circuit in Brimley concluded that “any board of education could certainly make rules and regulations that promote effective and efficient education of children, but it may not make rules and regulations that infringe on constitutional issues while not realistically and significantly furthering the board’s proper purposes.”

The dissent by Judge Meskill in East Hartford is extremely interesting, but did not carry the day. Judge Meskill felt that the Court had gone too far in its interpretation that a school board or administrative regulation requiring the wearing of a tie was a constitutional affront. In his view, “it is not the role of the federal courts to set aside decisions of school administrators which the Court may view as lacking a basis in wisdom or compassion.” Meskill continued, “The decision gives every public school teacher who feels that his employers have made an incorrect decision the right to invoke the aide of the federal courts. If trivial activities are brought under constitutional protection the First Amendment of the Constitution will be trivialized.”

Deborah McGlothin, as an expression of her religious and cultural heritage, would at times wear a head-wrap to class during periods of what she called her “spiritual growth.” The principal had a rule that prohibited the wearing of headdresses, hats or (interestingly enough) blue jeans by classroom personnel. (McGlothin v. Jackson, 1990)

McGlothin refused to discontinue her wearing of head-wraps and was discharged by the board of education for insubordination. The Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled in favor of the school district on a set of circumstances that were unique to the case. The principal had convened what was termed as “a school shared governance committee,” that had subscribed to the principal’s stipulations concerning the issue of headdress and blue jeans. The fact that the principal had collaborated with teachers in the formulation of the policy was important to the Court. Meeting with the staff concerning any proposed dress code consideration would appear to be a prudent strategy for any administrator. At least it impressed this Court and I believe that it would also help to placate a group of teachers.

The Supreme Court of Mississippi stated that “public schools have authority to promulgate and enforce reasonable dress codes for faculty.” The example that the Court gave, attempting some humor it would seem, was that “no doubt a school could preclude a Native American teacher from coming to work dressed as an Indian warrior, with a full-feathered headpiece, clad in a loincloth, war-painted, carrying a tomahawk, or a Christian teacher coming to school nude emulating Adam or Eve before the Fall.”

McGlothin was not claiming that her headdress was part of any “organized” religious statement, but Ella Downing certainly was in a teacher dress case that was decided in 2001. Downing wore a tee shirt to her keyboarding class with the words “JESUS 2000---J2K” prominently displayed on the front in capital letters. (Downing v. Board, 2001)

Downing was ordered to cover up the tee shirt, which she did with a laboratory coat for the remainder of the day. The District Court of Connecticut that reviewed this case concluded that “a school risks violation of the Establishment Clause if any of its teachers’ activities gives the impression that the school endorses religion.” Consequently the administration was well within its rights to censor the message on this particular tee shirt.

These cases may seem somewhat antiquated in time, or not exactly fitting the situation of Dr. Spiffy, but they do offer direction and are illustrative of what courts may approve and disapprove in terms of teacher appearance. Blue jeans are something that a person can put on and take off, unlike facial hair, which is part of the persona of the teacher twenty-four hours a day. Teachers are literally free to wear blue jeans before and after school and on weekends, meaning that any rule forbidding jeans is obviously less onerous to the individual’s liberty than a rule forbidding facial hair for teachers. A rule against blue jeans is not discriminatory as female teachers as well as male staff members are equally affected. However, any prospective teacher dress code must be reasonably related to a legitimate educational purpose, which must be justified by standards of reasonableness. A federal court in New Hampshire in 1970 ruled that a student dress code prohibiting the wearing of jeans by students because “jeans detract from discipline and proper educational climate” was not constitutional because the district had shown no evidence supporting this position. (Bannister v. Paradis, 1970)

The Bannister decision came upon the heels of Tinker, linking the notion that student conduct may not be infringed upon by just a suspicion of disruption. The court in Bannister did write that “a school can and must …exclude persons who are unsanitary, obscenely, or scantily clad…because it is obvious that the lack of proper covering particularly with female students, might tend to distract the other students and disrupt the educational process.”

Two other cases involving jeans that concern students are illustrative of how teacher dress codes may be constructed. A Connecticut court upheld a middle school ban on all blue jeans because there had been substantial student conflict over designer blue jeans, including fights, thefts, and harassment. (Byers v. Waterbury, 2001) A North Carolina court held in Fowler v. Williamson, 1979 that a student was correctly excluded from the graduation ceremony because he wore blue jeans, violating a rule that men were required to wear “dress pants” under the graduation gown. I know that I would not advise any principal to go as far as Fowler, but if jeans are truly causing a disruption then it appears that at least one court is receptive to a ban.

Any obvious violation of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, that is not excessively intrusive on the Free Exercise Clause of the same Amendment, will likely be supported by the courts when it is related to teacher’s apparel or appearance as evidenced by the Downing decision.

Detailed student dress codes are indeed constitutional if they have an educational rationale and are not unnecessarily vague. See Beau v. Fort Thomas, 2005 and Long v. Board, 2000, as examples. Why then should it not be possible to establish a dress code for teachers which are both rational and constitutional?

The California School Board Association has an optional policy which school boards may adopt that deals specifically with teacher dress codes. The CSBA optional policy states:

“The Governing Board believes that since teachers serve as role models, they should maintain professional standards of dress and grooming. Just as overall attitude and instructional competency contribute to a productive learning environment, so do appropriate dress and grooming. The Board encourages staff during school hours to wear clothing that demonstrates their high regard for education and presents an image consistent with their job responsibilities. Clothes that may be appropriate for shop instructors or gym teachers may not be appropriate for classroom teachers.”

Although the New Mexico School Board Association has no teacher dress code as such, the NMSBA has established a student dress code which is available to districts that emphasizes that “each student’s mode of dress and grooming is a manifestation of personal style and individual preference, and the board will not interfere with the rights of students and their parents to make decisions regarding their appearance except when their choices affect the educational program, or the health and safety of others.” The model policy goes on to list hazards to the health and safety of the student or others; materially interfering with school work; creating disorder, or disruption of the educational program; causing excessive wear or damage to school property; represent membership in a gang; or obscene language or symbols, or symbols of sex, drugs, or alcohol on clothing are expressly prohibited.

It is likely true that the preponderance of teachers in most schools will come dressed for school based on a definition of ‘appropriate’ as outlined in the CBSA policy for teachers and the NMSBA model policy for students. It might seem rational if schools that have issues with teacher dress utilize their student dress code, and hold teachers to those exact same standards. Might it be if teachers were held to a similar standard that the student dress code would be more universally enforced by the staff?

In 2000 the school district in Campbell County, Ohio formulated a teacher dress code that deemed inappropriate for teachers athletic shoes; hiking boots; Capri pants; jeans (denim or chambray); visible body piercing (other than the ears); coaching shorts; Hawaiian wear; zippered tops; halter tops; muscle shirts; leotards and tank tops; sheer or see-through clothing; backless tops; and short-sleeved knit shirts worn without a sport coat. (Carlton, 2000) After the school board approved the dress code a member of the Ohio Board of Education said that this was the first teacher dress code in the state of Ohio, as far as was known.

Dress codes have to a degree divided the nation. Some federal appeals courts have decided that grooming is a constitutional right and unless school officials can present evidence that they are fair, reasonable, and necessary to carry out a legitimate educational purpose, they will be held unconstitutional. The arbitrary rule of “no facial hair” would likely not be acceptable in the First, Second, Fourth, Seventh and Eighth Circuits.

In the Third, Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits the courts have ruled that grooming is not generally a significant constitutional issue and the federal courts should not judge the local wisdom of school boards.

The answer is once again, it depends. School boards and administrators should contact their school attorney before any teacher dress codes are contemplated. It might be suggested that the principal, being in charge of the building, should speak directly to the individual teacher who may have a problem with his or her grooming or attire in an attempt to settle the problem at this fundamental level. Most school administrators say they prefer to deal with teacher appearance problems with an individual personally, instead of adopting a policy. (Aguilar, 2005) This may be acceptable; however, there are dangers if enforcement is not consistent.

Another answer might be to combine a rational and legal recognized teacher dress code statement with a student dress code and transfigure both into one dress code for the school. If flip-flops are not acceptable for students because of a safety factor, then they should not be acceptable for staff either. If a bare midriff is not acceptable for students, then it is not acceptable for teachers. If the only body piercing for students that is acceptable (for public view) is earrings of a respectable length and size that they do not cause a safety hazard or a disruption, then this is the rule for the staff also. And, what about tattoos? If tattoos must be covered for students, should they not be for staff as well?

Dr. Spiffy was the superintendent in his district for two years and after he moved on to a new superintendency his successor placed no importance on denim one way or the other and the district went back to status quo, for the time being.

In his new job, Dr. Spiffy moved slowly and formed a committee comprised of several different stakeholders to discuss and formulate a teacher dress code. The teacher dress code that was approved by the committee and the school board reflected the student dress code almost to the letter. The dress codes that are applicable to both students and teachers include: Skirts should fall at or below the knee; midriffs should not be visible; shoes must be closed heel or pump style, no flip-flops; shoes must be shined; shirts and blouses must be tucked in; no tattoos are to be visible; no body piercing except for the ears; no spaghetti strap tops; and no shorts. Male teachers are to wear dress slacks. Likewise, female teachers may not wear jeans.

All new teachers at the beginning of the school year are given an in-service on the issue of proper professional attire. Facial hair has not been an issue with Dr. Spiffy, as his beard is neatly coiffed.

References

Aguilar, A. (2005). Teacher attire in class does not go unnoticed. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, October 3, 2005. Retrieved from http://campus.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?sv=Split&cecasf=count&service=S

Bannister v. Paradis, 316 F.Supp. 185 (D.N.H. 1970).

Blanchett v. Vermillion Parish School Board, 220 So. 2d. 534 (La., 1969).

Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005).

Braxton v. Board of Public Instruction of Duval County, Florida, 303 F. Supp. 958 (Fl.,1969).

Byars v. City of Waterbury, 795 A.2d 630 (Conn.Super., 2001).

Carlton, J. & McCain M. (2000). Campbell teachers told to dress up. Enquirer Local News Coverage. Retrieved March 19, 2007, from http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2000/07/26/loc_campbell_teachers.html

Downing v. West Haven Board of Education, 162 F.Supp.2d 19 (Conn. 2001).

East Hartford Education Association v. East Hartford Board, 562 F.2d. 838 (Conn., 1977)

Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)

Finot v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 250 Cal. App2d. 189 (1977)

Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973).

Hughes, K. (2006). Districts on teacher dress: Have some class. The Dallas Morning News, September 15, 2006. Retrieved from http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/0915dnmetteacherdr

Karr v. Schmidt, 401 U.S. 989 (1972).

Kelley v. Johnson, 42 U.S. 238 (1976).

Long v. Bd. of Educ., of Jefferson County, 121 F.Supp.2d 621 (W.D.Ky., 2000).

Lucia v. James Duggan, 303 F.Supp. 112 (Mass., 1969).

McGlothin v. Jackson municipal Separate School, 556 So.2d. 324 (Miss., 1990).

Miller v. School District Number 167, 495 F.2d. 658 (7th Cir., 1974).

Morrison v. Hamilton County Board of Education, 494 S.W.2d. 770 (Tn., 1973).

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

Solochek, J.S. (2007). Teacher dress code left to principals. St. Petersburg Times, St. Petersburg, Florida, March 16, 2007. Retrieved from http://www.sptimes.com/03/16/news_pf/Pasco/Teacher_dress_code_le.shtml

Sweeney, A.M. (2006). Are teacher dress codes required? The Stamford Advocate, Stamford, Connecticut, August 3, 2006. Retrieved from http://campus.westlaw.com/result/documenttext.aspx?sv=Split&cecasf=count&service=S

Tardif v. Thomas Quinn, 545 F.2d. 761 (Mass., 1976).

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).

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This work is licensed by Charles Waggoner under a Creative Commons Attribution License (CC-BY 2.0).

Last edited by National Council of Professors of Educational Administration on Jan 30, 2008 12:14 pm US/Central.