It has been said that bilingualism without diglossia (this is a group that speaks two languages without rigorously establishing a functional duality of the languages), although it is a reality individually, sociologically it is an entelechy and the linguistic policies that aspire to that objective lead no where. Richard Rodriguez (1992), on his behalf, has written that the bilingual education and, therefore, its objective is a romantic trap of the 1960s in which the leaders of the Hispanic community absurdly aspired to remain with the best thing of the Spanish and the English language, the private and public, the field and the city, without realizing that it is impossible to be two at the same time. In this dilemma, Rodriguez says the public and the city always win for the simple reason that it is the city that pays.
Without a discussion, in this last epigraph, I suggest that the Hispanics in the U.S. are entering a critical period in which, due to a series of factors, the iron law of the linguistic assimilation can break, giving rise to the possibility that the acquisition of the English language does not mean the inexorable loss of the Spanish language. This would invest the tendency of associating social and academic promotions with the progressive loss of the maternal language. Today, luckily, there are indications in short and medium terms that confirm the change of tendency, according to which the Spanish language would stop being associated with poverty and ignorance, and would begin to be perceived as a language compatible with the public life, as a means of work opportunities and economic income, and, mainly, as a source of self-esteem and cultural collective identity. In this point of inflexion, the attitudes of low linguistic self-esteem would yield to a more generalized attitude of loyalty toward the Spanish language. The following paragraphs mention some of the factors considered responsible for this break or inflection point that is aimed toward the establishment of a stable bilingualism without diglossia, to the maintenance of the Spanish language amongst Hispanics.
First is the demographic data. According to the data of the U.S. Census Office in the year 2000, the Hispanic population ascended to 35.2 million, which was equivalent to 12.5% of the American population, about 281 million people. The total number of Hispanics grew 60% in comparison with the census of 1990, and 25% compared with the 1970 census. With this data, the Hispanic population has become the “largest minority community of the nation,” exceeding the African-Americans in number for the first time. In 2003, the Hispanic population reached 40 million people (44 million including the inhabitants of Puerto Rico), a number that surpasses the population of Colombia (almost 41 million) and that is equal to that of Spain. Among the Latin American countries at the present time, only México, with more than 100 million, has a greater population. In a scenario of continued immigration and moderate rate of natural growth, the Hispanic population will continue to grow until reaching 25% of the North American population in 2050, equaling 103 million people.
To understand the sociolinguistic meaning of this accelerated growth of Hispanics in the U.S., one has to reflect on the derived consequences of this simple numerical amount, on the composition by ages of the population pyramid, as well as on its geographic distribution in states and cities that are crucial in the electoral processes and in the economic and cultural march of the country. Thus, by the mere fact of being more than 40 million, the Hispanic community becomes the second largest population of the Hispanic world after Mexico. This means that its degree of visibility in the American multiethnic mosaic increases considerably, and this greater presence reinforces the identifying characteristics of time that demands a greater recognition of the rest of the society.
The composition by ages of demographic structure of the Hispanics reflects a population pyramid typically youthful where the infant and adolescent groups have a remarkably superior percentage representation, not only to the adult groups, but those of the same age groups in the North American society in general and the Anglo-Saxon society individually. Inversely, the age group between 45 and 54 among Hispanics is remarkably inferior to the same age group of the total American population. If the different fertility and birth rates of the Hispanic community are added to this, including African-Americans, one must conclude that Hispanics are a group with a high growth potential and, therefore, an emergent group in scopes of the economy, politics, and culture. And although it is shown that second or third generation Hispanics demonstrate a preference for the English language, we conjectured that a series of sociological and political factors can be neutralizing that tendency.
But it is the geographic distribution of the Hispanic establishments along the U.S. that best characterizes this ethnic group as an emergent minority of growing visibility and crucial importance in the movement of electoral processes. Thus, the states with the largest percentage and absolute number of Hispanics are California (11 million), Texas (6 million), New York (3 million), Florida (2.5 million), and Illinois (1.5 million). If we consider that the mentioned states show the greatest political weight of the Union regarding the allocation of electoral votes, representing 31% of these votes, it is easy to conclude that the Hispanic vote, in spite of its little political participation to this day, can make a great difference in the balance of electoral confrontation, as it has in fact happened in the presidential elections of 2000 with a Republican victory in Florida with a Latin majority, as well as with Democrate victory in New Mexico, also with a Latin majority. It is certain that this political potential of Hispanics has not yet given all of its results in the first place because half of the Hispanic population is composed of “non-citizens;” secondly, because the Latin naturalized immigrants vote less than Hispanics born in the U.S.; thirdly, because Hispanics are concentrated in non-disputed states like California and Texas, which means that their votes have little repercussion; and fourthly, due to the structure of the electoral process, the demography growth demands the creation of districts that allow the Latinos to obtain positions at local and state level, but do not contribute to a noticeable influence in the national elections. For that reason, as affirmed by Rodolfo O. De la Garza (2004), although the demographic growth has pushed the Latinos to the center of national politics, it does not bear a narrow relation with the political influence that the Hispanic community has at this moment.
Be what it may, the certain thing is that a greater presence of Hispanics in politics has supposed a jump, unimaginable a few years ago, of the Spanish language to the political area, whether in the Spanish reply of the New Mexican Governor Richardson to President Bush’s speech to the State of the Union January 21, 2004, or with the bilingual debates in the primaries of national character as it happened on September 2003, or with the electoral publicity the Republican party printed in Vista, the Spanish magazine with the greatest diffusion in the nation. There is no doubt that this leap toward the first plane of a language that has always worked as an opaque rumor has contributed to improving the linguistic self-esteem of Hispanics and to reinforce their feeling of loyalty to the maternal language (Bred, 2004).
On the other hand, in spite of their agricultural occupations, especially in the enclave of the Mexican-Americans of the southwest, Hispanics reside preferably in cities with great vitality, like global cities where there is a large percentage of world-wide commerce, especially that oriented to Latin America. Thus, 6 million Hispanics reside in the metropolitan area of Los Angeles, representing 34% of that metropolitan population; 3 million in the area of New York, representing 15%; 1.5 million in the Miami and Lauderdale area, representing 34%; 1 million in San Francisco Bay, including Silicone Valley, representing 16%; another million in the Chicago area, representing 11%; and another million in Houston, representing 21% of its urban population. In this urban globalized world, the presence of Spanish in the work market is more and more essential as time goes by. Global cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Miami, recognized as the commercial capital of Latin America, cities with a great control of the financial and commercial traffic, obligatorily require the presence of the Spanish language, which makes this language a “plus” of labor opportunities for Spanish-speakers that have managed to maintain their maternal language. This eliminates the old paradox saying Hispanic adults must spend long hours of their life trying to acquire a language they lost as a child because of a rigorous monolingual policy that imposed speaking only English. This added value to the Spanish language in the labor world is confirmed by the results of a survey of Center For Labor Research & Studies in April 2004, directed toward Cubans and Cuban-Americans of South Florida, where 70% of the interviewees and the majority of those born in the U.S. consider that speaking Spanish is helpful to find a job (Bred, 2004, p. 90). One more proof that the Spanish language, besides having a strong identity value, is a strong utilitarian component instrumental in the human and social capital of Hispanics.
There is a phenomenon between Hispanics of the U.S. that, without a doubt, will have a positive impact in the maintenance of Spanish of the second and third generations. I refer to the creation of authentic transnational communities through the flow of remittances, information, and contacts on behalf of the respective diasporas of Latin immigrants. As affirmed by Alexander Portes (2004, p. 10), nowadays, the remittances of the Latin immigrants fully exceed the foreign aid received by the country, competes in size with the extreme total of direct foreign investments, and some exceed the total income obtained from exports. In countries like Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador, the immigrants’ remittances are among the three main sources of currency, becoming thus fundamentally integral to the national economy. But the volume of the remittances is not only enormous, but regular and stable throughout time, which allows international banks to use the future remittances as a collateral guarantee at the time of granting loans to banks of the origin countries. That is how the modest wage-earning work of immigrants hits the world-wide economy through the activation of the five T’s of economic integration: tourism, telecommunications, transport (aerial), transference of remittances, and trade commerce denominated nostalgic. A pursuit of these five axes, as Manuel Orozco (2004) did, would discover the complexity that the impact of these remittances have in the economies of the origin countries.
But these transnational communities are not only an economic reality but also a political reality. The political parties of Mexico, Dominican Republic, and Colombia have offices in Los Angeles, Miami, and New York from which they present their electoral candidates, gather funds for the campaigns, and obtain votes that can be decisive in the electoral fights. At the same time, this intense bidirectional traffic of information, goods, and people deeply influence the origin nations. The birth among the organized diasporas of associations with the place of origin, known as HTA (Hometown Associations), has a more than considerable volume in the diverse enclaves of Hispanics in the U.S. Its purpose is other than to conserve the cultural bonds and to improve situations in the communities of the origin countries. This way, it is confirmed once again that the Latin migratory experience has differentiating characteristics from that of European immigrant groups. This continuous bond with the origin country will contribute, without a doubt, reinforcing linguistic loyalty with the Spanish language and, therefore, to its maintenance.
The massive presence of Hispanics in the urban world has shot a proliferation of communication medias that use Spanish to communicate with their audience. Only the National Association of Hispanic Publications includes 180 publications that spread 10 million newspaper units and magazines, most of them written in Spanish. If we were to add the 600 radio transmitters, plus 100 TV transmitters with regular programs in Spanish, we can have an idea of the formidable presence of the Hispanic in the media. And it is that 40 million Hispanics, with an annual spending power of nearly 700 billion dollars, constitute a very tempting market for the commercial publicity, which has turned to commercial bilingualism as a marketing strategy. According to Arnulfo Ramirez (1992), many medias in English turn to expressions in Spanish to sell more among Hispanics. On the other hand, the Spanish media turn to English to attract those second or third generation Hispanics whose Spanish begins to weaken, which confirms the advertising slogan, “It's a whole nuevo mundo out there.” The dollar has discovered the Hispanic market, and money, as already known, speaks all languages. And it is that, according to some market investigations, the commercial publicity in Spanish has turned out to be more effective among the Hispanic population than that in English. The advertisements in Spanish are more persuasive; that is to say, they more effectively urge a purchase and remain a longer time in the receiver’s memory than advertisements in English. This practice of commercial bilingualism and the publicity’s preference of the Spanish language demonstrate that that new world out there is a world where Spanish refuses to disappear, and the number of bilinguals continues to increase.
On the other hand, there are the cognitive advantages of bilingualism. The times in which psycholinguistic maintained a negative association among bilingualism and cognitive development, to the point of attributing bilingualism the responsibility of the mental setback of immigrant’s children, were left behind. Luckily, recent studies have demonstrated the opposite; that is to say, a positive association among bilingualism, academic results, and cognitive flexibility. This last advantage goes along with this, since bilingual persons by definition counts with more than one way of naming the same thing, which frees them of the tyranny of words, and allows them to look at the language and not through the language as is expressed by monolingual persons.
And, finally, the rewards of the symbolic capital are derived from the maintenances of Spanish as the maternal language. It is true that belonging to a speaking community is not the same as feeling like part of a family, a government, or a religion. However, the feeling of belonging to a community of speakers has something of the three things. In this sense, the symbolic role of the language has nothing to do with the functions of communication, persuasion, or thought. This function of integration and reinforcement of self-esteem and identity of the people is probably the first and last reason which so many languages refuse to die. Labov tells the case of a boy in a public school in New York that resisted any attempt of linguistic assimilation within the English standard. Labov attributed this resistance to the deep loyalty that the boy professed to Black English, the language of his gang in the corner of the district. Arnulfo Ramirez (1992) presents the testimony, a bit more dramatic, of a young Texan student:
Cuando nosotros hablamos en chicano, tenemos más feeling que hablar en el standard, porque nosotros asina nos criamos, con esa lengua que inventamos, y asina sufrimos y asina lloramos y asina jugamos, y por eso esa lengua, you know, it’s our feeling (p. 79).
A stirring testimony that reminds us of the linguistic conflict of those second or third generation young Hispanics that form that segment of population between standard English and standard Spanish who have chosen a third rout, that of slang. Perhaps there does not have to be a conflict of linguistic loyalties. Perhaps a variety of a local dialect can coexist with a standardized language. But it is certain that, according to the prospective demographic, The Texan boy by 2020 is going to live in a Hispanic community of 50 million, and that only if he is able in his daily routine to change from Tex-Mex to the standardized Spanish of the U.S. will he be able to play an excellent role in the country where he lives, as well as in the set of the nations that speak Spanish.