According to the AARP (quoting Bureau of the Census statistics), there were, as of 1993, 32.8 million elderly representing 12.7% of the entire population of the United Sates and that number is expanding: the number of elderly has increased by 5% since 1990 compared to a 3% increase in the size of the population under 65, and by 2030 the number of those over 65 is projected by the Census Bureau to be 70.2 million or 20% of the entire population (A Profile 1-2 [1994]), moreover, “the fastest growing segment of this older population is the age group 85 years and older; this segment is projected to double to 4.2 million persons by the year 2000” (INFO-PAK n. page. [1995]). Robert N. Binstock’s (1995) figure of 33 million members of the AARP (Binstock 71 [1995]) leads one to conclude that all people who are over 65 are members and indeed, the AARP (1995) lists its membership at “more than 33 million . . . [making it] the largest non-profit organization serving the needs of older persons in the United States” (AAARP News 1 [1995]), however, membership in AARP is not restricted to those who are considered elderly but is open to “anyone age 50 or older, both working and retired,” and, in fact, “over one-third of the Association’s membership is in the work force” (AAARP News” 1 [1995]) which accounts for the seemingly disparately large numbers of participants.,
The sheer size of the AARP makes it appear formidable, therefore, in order to “respond to charges being levied by some advocates of generational equity that [old age interest groups] are concerned with the special interests of the elderly population to the exclusion of the legitimate interests of any others.” Eric R. Kingson (1988) suggests that “the resources . . . at the disposal of elderly interest groups are more important to the success of their lobbying and other efforts than the perception that they are not selfish. After all, why should elder interest groups, or any other interest groups for that matter, be expected to be unselfish?” Furthermore, the elderly have enormous political clout at the polls—they vote in vast numbers. “The AARP’s, members, who are mainly middle class, can be counted on to turn out at election time. In 1980, 71% of Americans aged 55-64 went to the polls, compared with 36% of those aged 18-20.”,
Walter A. Rosenbaum (1993) and James W. Button contest Kingson’s (1988) view that there is “a deterioration in the public image upon which the political privilege of the aging is grounded [and which] is a bellwether of generational tension” and argue that most studies of political preferences among the elderly generally highlight only those issues and policies that directly impact the elderly rather than issues and policies that effect all Americans. Indeed, they found that “studies of candidate and party preference among the aging, like policy studies, seldom reveal significant associations between age and voting choice that cannot be explained by other socioeconomic factors.” Furthermore, it is clear that the vast majority of all money given to political parties is given to the party in power, so that access gained through financial means is largely based on pocketbook issues that effect most citizens. Moreover, Laurie A. Rhodebeck (1993) maintains that while “older Americans share common age-related concerns . . . they are ”“hardly subject to the solidifying experiences typical of [other minorities].” She further argues that:
several conditions seem likely to enhance cohesion among older people. The development of retirement communities may encourage interactions that foster an awareness of common political interests. The availability of senior citizen perquisites may promote a sense of group entitlement that extends to the policy arena. Finally, recent deficit reduction measures that have threatened the viability of public assistance for the elderly may serve as effective mobilizers of group interests and powerful inducements to the maintenance of group unity.
With the sea change in the American political scene from a largely liberal Democratic majority in the Congress to a predominately conservative Republican majority, lobbying and other special interest groups will find it necessary to modify their approaches. Indeed, as the political climate is transformed so must special interest and lobbying groups adjust their tactics if they are to be successful petitioners. Binstock (1995) offers a brief analysis of the changes that must take place if old-age activist groups are to maintain their ability to influence public policies:
Starting in the late 1970s and continuing into the mid-1990s, new stereotypes emerged in popular culture depicting older people as prosperous, hedonistic, selfish, and politically powerful, greedy geezers. . . . In this era the activities of old-age interest groups were aimed at protecting existing programs and their specific features. These defensive efforts were somewhat successful in the broad sense that cutbacks in old-age programs during this period were generally less than in other social programs.
Moreover, Binstock (1995) argues that, as the Congress, if not the country as a whole, becomes more partisan and more ideologically conservative “this new era in the policies of aging [will pose] difficult challenges for old-age interest groups. ”
Considering that largest of the age-related special interest groups Binstock (1995) says:
The most difficult and politically important choices will be those made by AARP . . . [which] is by far the most important [of all old-age advocacy groups] because of its huge membership . . . [of] 33 million members. (Binstock 71 [1995]) The enormous financial and personnel resources which AARP can muster is a classic example of RM that is evident in Binstock’s (1995) figures: “in 1994 AARP’s total revenue was $469 million . . . [and they had] 1,700 employees” not including a host of unpaid local community volunteers.
Nonetheless, Binstock (1995) finds that the AARP and other old-age organizations will be forced to make changes if they are to survive as viable and vigorous political forces. Indeed, as the political mood changes the social dynamic and the cultural milieu:
Proposals for major changes in programs on aging are being generated by conservative political principles and to balance the federal budget, without much attention to the implications for older people themselves . . . Consequently the old-age lobby is unlikely to have much impact unless its efforts are coincidentally fortified by more powerful political forces.
Robert N. Butler [1994], in 1993, also argued that the persuasive power of the AARP has declined:
Our form of special interest politics and government is reflected in organizations of older persons. These organizations are considered influential . . . the American media treat the AARP as if it were a very powerful special interest group. However, this is exaggerated. It has been weakened in recent years because of the Medicare Catastrophic Act and its repeal. In any case, compared to powerful interest groups within Washington, the AARP is not as strong an influence.
But Kingson (1988) argues that:
By broadening their agenda, aging advocacy organizations may increase their legitimacy and reduce the likelihood that the advocates of various groups (the old, the disabled, the young) will expend resources engaging in divisive competition. And coalitions may provide an important means of expanding needed programs and services to all groups while simultaneously protecting existing services and programs against erosion.
Whether such coalition building will occur and be politically successful is purely speculative but further study on coalition politics would be worth pursuing. Although the causal factors involved in political participation and activism among the general populace are problematic due to the various theoretical paradigms employed to explain such behavior, little specific research has been conducted on the involvement of the elderly. Furthermore, as the “Baby Boomer” generation reaches retirement age such research might prove to be an important addition to the literature. As this more affluent and activist cohort ages, and discovers that, as Alan Neustadtl (1990) argues, “money purchases access at declining rates” will they engage in higher levels of political and social activism as they find that “highly visible (and often emotionally charged) issues require a greater adherence [by elected officials and decision makers] to party and constituent desires?” Arguments used to exist over proper implementation of social welfare programs for the elderly, not over the existence of such programs but as the political situation reverses liberal legislation will the AARP join with other lobbying groups for the disadvantaged to preserve the status quo? The entire field of gerontology is ripe for study and theory development and so is the field of political activism among the elderly; the changes that will ensue as one cohort of the newly elderly slowly replaces the previous generation of elderly will be a fecund ground for social science research.